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E x E c u T i v E  S u m m a R y
Progressive public banking is essential for sustainable development. Turkey’s experience illus-
trates this point, where state-owned banks have been at the centre of national developmental 
strategies and public infrastructure building since the early 20th century, collecting people’s 
savings and using them for domestic loans to fund government projects. The Turkish govern-
ment later encouraged private banking as part of an economic liberalization experiment, but 
frustrated by this process it turned to a state-led developmental strategy. Some 10 state-owned 
commercial banks and three development banks would come to control just over 70 per cent of 
the sector’s assets by the 1970s, providing loans that far outstripped those of private and foreign 
banks. 
Thirty years of neoliberal restructuring followed, with a renewed push for privatization after 
the 2001 Turkish banking crisis. Nonetheless, three large state-owned commercial banks and 
three small development banks continue to offer alternative sources of financing for national 
development. Together they control about 30 per cent of the sector’s assets, equaling nearly 
US$193 billion. They have worked sustainably toward achieving their institutionalized develop-
mental mandates, funding industrialization, public infrastructure, other state-owned enterprises, 
agriculture, small trades, cooperatives, and so on. 
This study builds an historical and qualitative perspective on the state banking experience of 
Turkey, exploring motivations behind changes in state-owned banks (SOBs) and examining dif-
fering perceptions of state banking, drawing on extensive interviews with more than 50 key 
actors in this sector. We conclude that the public banking model can allow these institutions to 
diverge from private, profit-maximizing imperatives with clear advantages: 
focus on extra-market financial coordination•	
support in times of financial crisis•	
access to finance•	
provision of a savers’ safe haven•	
improved efficiency•	
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However, for advocates of progressive alternatives to private provisioning today it is important 
to recognize that the SOBs’ new profit mandates have eroded their social and developmental 
‘alternative’ efficacy. The public banking model is clearly under threat and there is an urgent 
need to develop and discuss popular and political strategies that aim not simply to defend 
Turkey’s SOBs but to reclaim their most progressive mandates and to innovate well beyond their 
present limitations. 
In the context of an ongoing global economic crisis that has siphoned trillions of public dollars 
into private bank bailouts, the Turkish experience can offer important and timely insights into 
viable alternatives to private banking that can contribute to more sustainable and progressive 
patterns of development and the strengthening of the public sector as a whole. 
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Introduction
State-owned banks (SOBs) have long provided alternative financing for development, but much 
like other public services they have undergone neoliberal processes of privatization and market-
oriented restructuring over the past few decades. Nonetheless, important SOBs remain in dozens of 
countries around the world where they provide public financing for essential services such as water, 
health care and electricity, and offer stable developmental credits (see Marois 2013). Turkey is a case 
in point, where SOBs have managed to preserve important and unique functions, although they 
have not been leveraged to extend essential services. 
This discussion is particularly timely as the US sub-prime crisis has triggered a costly financial calam-
ity on a global scale, with trillions of public dollars spent on private bank bailouts. While advocates 
of the status quo still dominate the agenda, we see that contemporary experiences with state bank-
ing offer important and timely lessons that point to viable alternatives to private banking.
It is our contention that progressive public sector financing of development and public infrastruc-
ture is essential to promote non-neoliberal development strategies. Yet it is in this field of ‘financing 
for development’ where our collective knowledge of existing alternative banking practices is most 
lacking and where neoliberal financial orthodoxy is most entrenched.
In this regard, the case of public banking in Turkey is instructive. Despite 30 years of neoliberal 
restructuring, three large state-owned commercial banks and three small development banks con-
tinue to offer alternative sources of financing for development. State-owned banks have been at 
the centre of Turkey’s national developmental and public infrastructure building strategies from the 
early 20th century. With branches spread across the country, the SOBs collected people’s savings 
and used them for domestic loans to help fund government projects. For decades, the state banks 
have worked sustainably toward achieving their institutionalized developmental mandates, fund-
ing industrialization, public infrastructure, other state-owned enterprises, agriculture, small trades, 
cooperatives, and so on.
Problems periodically arose in the state banks’ operations but it was not until the late 1990s – due 
to the instability generated by Turkey’s neoliberal transition – that they ran into serious troubles. The 
2001 Turkish banking crisis provided an opportunity for neoliberal advocates to enforce market-
oriented restructuring, including ideological reforms imposed on the SOBs. Notwithstanding, we 
argue that Turkey’s SOBs still offer a progressive alternative to the private provisioning of finance for 
development in the country, as they remain the only existing alternative banking option and their 
institutional foundations hold great potential to move beyond neoliberalism.
This paper looks specifically at the experience of SOBs in Turkey, situating the discussion within 
the larger debate about public versus private finance. We highlight the potential and challenges of 
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public banking in general, and the ways in which it may be used to finance public services in Turkey. 
Although Turkey has its peculiarities the hope is that this case study will help inform debates about 
public banking in other parts of the world. 
Are state banks different?1
It must be emphasized that our discussion and defence of Turkey’s SOBs does not rest on idealized 
notions of ‘state’ ownership, as if it constituted a progressive alternative to private provisioning in 
and of itself. Our aim is rather to point out that the progressive alternatives suggested by Turkey’s 
SOBs, real and potential, derive from their special reproductive foundations and roots in the pub-
lic sector, enabling them to potentially diverge from the profit imperatives by which their private 
counterparts are structurally bound. This is not to say that state enterprises, including Turkey’s SOBs, 
could not become profit-driven; such ideological choices depend on how relationships of power 
and class are crystallized in the state apparatus and in the state banks. 
State-owned banks are themselves historically malleable institutionalizations of social power and 
class relations, and thus SOBs are open to collectively organized change (Marois 2012, 29; see also 
Hilferding 2006). This approach demands more case study and qualitative investigations of state 
banking institutions as understood within prevailing structures of accumulation. So while we, in the 
first instance, identify ‘state’ ownership quantitatively as one in which the state has majority owner-
ship of a bank, with some forms of state management and political oversight (see McDonald and 
Ruiters 2012, 3-7), the deeper meanings of such ownership remains to be excavated qualitatively 
and historically within the structural confines of capitalism.
The comparison with private ‘corporate’ banks is nevertheless stark. Private banks must compete to 
constantly earn profits or they will cease to exist (Guttmann 1994, 19). State authorities can regulate 
this condition of capitalist reproduction (as has been done more heavily in the postwar era) but au-
thorities can never eliminate this profit imperative without eliminating the private bank itself. 
State banks, on the other hand, exist within the state’s institutional and material matrix, and this 
gives them a different basis of reproduction that can allow them to potentially diverge from private, 
profit-maximizing imperatives. This is because governments generate incoming public revenue 
from different sources that are not restricted to market competition, such as taxation, surplus gener-
ation from state-owned enterprises and by borrowing against future public revenues (see O’Connor 
2009, 179). In this way the state apparatus is, as Neil Brenner writes, “well equipped to channel flows 
of value” (1998, 469). All incoming public revenues can cross-subsidize different public operations. 
It follows that SOBs can (and do) lose money, can (and do) break even, or can (and do) profit – but 
this depends on their particular and changeable institutional and political priorities rather than any 
inherent behaviour attached to ownership. 
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This is what makes SOBs special credit granting institutions: they are not necessarily determined 
by profit mandates but can respond to other socially determined needs. However, this does not 
guarantee that SOBs will work in some general public interest. Market-oriented restructuring can 
set state banks on an aggressively profit-oriented path too. In short, it is not ‘ownership’ that distin-
guishes state from private banks but their objectively different institutional and material foundations 
of reproduction, which are subject to overarching political and social contingencies.
A history of state-owned banks in 
Turkey
In Turkey, as in other parts of the world, finding capital to fund the transition to post-colonial capi-
talism was a challenge. The solution was to support the development of banks, with the capacity to 
collect money savings and mobilize them as loanable capital through a ‘fractional reserve’2 system.
Most of these early banks were private and/or foreign banks tied to the colonial and imperial 
ambitions of European powers. In Turkey, for example, the European-owned Ottoman Bank took 
control over the waning Empire’s finances in 1863 (known as the odious ‘Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration’), earning enormous returns by recycling official debts (Eldem 2005; see also Pamuk 
2004). Where local private banks emerged they were often small-scale and integrated into extractive 
industries such as mining. It was never the case that the private sector seamlessly filled the need 
for investment funding and public infrastructure. Private banks simply were unwilling and unable 
to respond to Turkey’s larger developmental financial needs (see Kuruç 1987). Turkish state authori-
ties had to find alternative means of pooling and mobilizing domestic savings – and the creation of 
state banks became the only solution (see Gerschenkeron 1962). From the founding of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, state banks have assumed an active and influential role in financing national de-
velopment and state-building processes (BAT 1999).
“the transition to capitalism in turkey, while sharing problems of scarce resources 
like all other peripheral economies at the time, also faced the problem of Islam and 
religious injunctions against charging interest on top of the already weak ottoman tax 
infrastructure. this made it difficult to accumulate capital in the new republic of turkey, 
and why banking was a focal point of the 1923 Izmir economic congress.” 
Former high-ranking treasury official, long-time state bureaucrat, academic. Author inter-
view, April 2013, Ankara.
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Over the next decade or so Turkish state authorities crafted a powerful state-owned commercial 
banking apparatus (see Table 1). For our purposes, commercial banks can be understood as stan-
dard public deposit-taking, multi-branch, multi-service credit institutions. Development banks, by 
contrast, usually do not accept public deposits and are specialized institutions. Both, however, can 
extend loans well in excess of their reserves. While Turkish authorities experimented early on with 
development banking (for example, the Türkiye Sanayii ve Maadin Bank established 1925), ‘devel-
opment’ banks as such have never been especially important in the country. Rather, authorities 
focused on building large state-owned and deposit-taking commercial banks that nonetheless had 
clearly mandated developmental orientations (Öztürk et al 2010, 161). 
The oldest, largest, and most important example of such commercial banks that persists today is 
Ziraat Bank (Agriculture Bank, established 1863), whose mandate and credit operations have been 
tailored to supporting farmers and agrarian development. Ziraat is formally linked to the Ministry 
of Agriculture, which sets the agricultural rate of interest. A second important SOB was Sümerbank 
(established 1933), which was mandated to finance Turkey’s state-led development strategy by 
channelling credits into other SOEs (Keser 1993, 77). Various local People’s Banks also emerged at the 
same period to service their mandated communities of cooperatives, trades and crafts persons, and 
shopkeepers through their formal links to the Ministry of Industry; these SOBs have since merged 
into Turkey’s second largest SOB, Halkbank. The Belediyeler (Municipalities Bank, established 1933), 
for its part, was merged into the development bank, İller Bank (Provinces’ Bank), in 1945 and contin-
ues to support Turkey’s municipal, village, and provincial authorities in funding infrastructure.
Ta b l e  1 :  
State-owned commercial banks in the early Turkish Republic
State bank Year established Mandated development mission or target funding
Ziraat bank 1863/1888 Agriculture
emlak bank 1927 Home mortgages and real estate loans




Municipal infrastructure projects such as water, electricity, 
drainage, and the preparation of building plans
etibank 1935 Electrical power generation capacity and the financing of 
mining and mineral marketing
Denizbank 1937 Maritime development
Halkbank 1938 Cooperatives, artisans, tradespersons, and small-scale 
producers
 Source: BAT 1999; BAT 2009.
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From the mid-1940s and late 1950s, the Turkish government encouraged private banking as part 
of an economic liberalization experiment. Frustrated by this process, by the 1960s Turkey decisively 
turned to a state-led developmental strategy. Some 10 different state-owned commercial banks 
and three development banks would come to control just over 70 per cent of the sector’s assets 
within a decade, providing loans far outstripping those of the private and foreign banks combined 
(BAT 1999, 24; 1971). These SOBs worked in collaboration with Turkey’s State Planning Organization 
(Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müsteşarlığı), established in 1961 to coordinate investment, decide on 
subsidized credits, back new industrial investments and state-owned enterprises, and allocate for-
eign exchange as part of the coordinated Five Year Development Plans (Aydın 2005, 34-5; Keyder 
2000, 204; Marois 2012, 55-6). Until Turkey’s 1980s turn to neoliberalism the SOBs provided a stable, 
sustainable, and popular solution to the problem of funding national development.
Market-oriented restructuring
By the mid to late 1970s the so-called golden age of state-led capitalist development was in its 
twilight years. A series of oil shocks had hit the global economy in the 1970s and the US entered a 
period of high inflation and recession. In response, the US Treasury allowed domestic interest rates 
to soar causing interest rates elsewhere around the world to go as high as 20 per cent or more. The 
well-known debt crises that erupted across the developing world as a result provided an opportu-
nity for advocates of market-oriented development to press for structural changes that would have 
been impossible politically before the crisis, that is, to pursue neoliberalism (Cypher 1989; Harvey 
2005). 
Turkish society, too, suffered from this instability. The SOBs’ profitability and stability began to erode 
in the late 1970s as authorities envisioned a much greater role for private banking and finance in 
Turkey’s development model. The 1980s opened with a military coup and a subsequent authori-
tarian transition to neoliberalism and financial liberalization (Yalman 2009). However, authorities 
attempted no major ownership shifts in the banking sector. Over the next 20 years state bank con-
trol fell only by 6 per cent, from 45 per cent in the early 1980s to 39 per cent in the late 1990s 
(private domestic banks’ assets, correspondingly, grew from 44 to 50%) (BAT 1999, 24).
What changed was the way governing authorities used the SOBs’ developmental funding mecha-
nism, and with lasting consequences. For decades the SOBs fulfilled their developmental mandates 
and sustainably managed any assigned ‘duty losses’ – formally defined as a claim on the Turkish 
Treasury (and therefore on future public income) derived from officially subsidized lending and the 
accrued interest (BAT 2001). In other words, the SOB duty losses enabled state authorities to facili-
tate the post-war stability of capitalist development via value transfers to priority economic sectors 
and domestic capital (Marois 2012, 58, 116-118). 
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However, in the mid-1990s, and amid recurrent financial crises (from Mexico to East Asia to Russia 
and Brazil), Turkey’s neoliberal project appeared in jeopardy. In response Turkey’s ruling coalitions 
used the SOBs to hide government budget deficits in SOB books (BRSA 2003, 10; OECD 1999, 57). 
This allowed the government to kick the proverbial debt-can down the road with staggering public 
consequences. From a manageable 2.2 per cent of GNP in 1995, the unpaid duty losses swelled to 
13 per cent in 1999 ($2.77 to $19.2 billion) (World Bank 2000, 96). In doing so, Turkey’s neoliberal ad-
vocates used the SOBs to smooth the country’s socially volatile transition to neoliberalism (Bilimciler 
2001, 21; Ergüneş 2008; Marois 2012, 205). 
The exposure of the government’s malfeasance by the end of the 1990s, together with increasingly 
speculative private banking practices, triggered the massive 2000-2001 financial crisis in the coun-
try, which opened another phase of aggressive neoliberal restructuring (Akyüz and Boratav 2003). 
It took $22 billion in public funds to cover the SOBs’ duty losses and $25 billion to bail out the failed 
private banks, for a total equalling roughly 30 per cent of 2002 GDP (Marois 2011, 178). The subse-
quent 2001 Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP) brought structural changes to banking 
in Turkey. Specifically for the SOBs, the program established a two-stage restructuring project that 
involved the immediate financial reorganization of the state banks and their ongoing operational 
restructuring around market efficiency and profitability imperatives (see BRSA 2002; Marois 2012, 
172-177). The political goal was to make the SOBs approximate private sector banking operations in 
preparation for privatization. 
A decade later, mainstream accounts celebrate the long-term impact of the 2001 BSRP, pointing 
to the banking sector’s relative stability and high profitability (BAT 2008; Kibritçi Artar and Atılgan 
Sarıdoğan 2012; Tiryaki 2012). Others are more critical of the process, suggesting that the SOBs were 
blamed for a crisis not of their own making but nonetheless forced to undergo market-oriented 
restructuring. 
Turkey’s state-owned banks today
In advanced market economies, the current phase of capital accumulation is increasingly being de-
fined as ‘financialization’, which broadly means “the increase in the size and significance of financial 
markets and financial institutions in the modern macroeconomy” (Orhangazi 2008, 863). So it has 
been in Turkey, where banking sector growth has outpaced GDP growth. While Turkey’s GDP ex-
panded nearly eightfold between 1980 and 2010,  the country’s total banking assets jumped nearly 
32-fold (almost 90 per cent of GDP) and loans rose from $10 to $331 billion (BAT 2012, 27, 54). 
As of September 2013, there were six majority controlled SOBs in Turkey – three large commercial 
and three small development banks (see Table 2). The three state-owned commercial banks (Ziraat, 
Halkbank and VakıfBank) are the second, sixth and seventh largest banks in Turkey (see Table 3). 
10  MSP Occasional Paper No. 22 – December 2013
Together they control about 30 per cent of the sector’s assets equalling nearly US$193 billion. The 
small state-owned development banks control a mere two per cent of the banking sector’s assets 
combined. 
Ta b l e  2 :  
Ownership and control in Turkey’s state-owned banks, 2013
State-owned bank, 
type, and year 
established
Ownership profile





51.11% belongs to the Turkish Prime Ministry’s Privatization Administration; 
48.86% belongs to individuals and legal entities (via a 24.94% December 
2008 public offering and a 23.92% November 2012 public offering).
VakıfBank;  
Commercial (1954)
58.44% belongs to Turkish Foundations represented by the General Director 
of Foundations (by having privileged shares; 43% to Group A and 15.44% 
to Group B); 25.18% sold in a November 2005 public offering; remaining 
16.38% belongs to individuals and legal entities. 
Kalkınma Bank; 
Development (1975)




İller Bank;  
Development (1933)
82.56% belongs to municipalities; 10.39% to Special Provincial 
Administrations; 7.05% to villages.
Source: BRSA 2010, 5, 8.
All of Turkey’s state-owned banks are joint-stock companies where different state or governing au-
thorities own controlling shares. Of the six SOBs, Ziraat and Eximbank are fully owned by the federal 
state and the Turkish Treasury holds 99 per cent of Kalkınma Bank shares. İller Bank is also fully public 
but is controlled by provinces, municipalities and villages. VakıfBank is a special case where a cultural 
branch of the state, the Foundations Directorate, has controlling ownership on behalf of thousands 
of individual non-profit foundations (e.g. heritage sites) and has been partially privatized since 2005. 
Halkbank has had its shares transferred to the state’s Privatization Administration (which receives 
dividend payouts from Halkbank’s yearly returns). Two public offerings have sold off almost 50 per 
cent of its shares. Nonetheless, state authorities retain controlling shares in all six banks and this of-
fers a potentially powerful lever of domestic extra-economic coordination unlike any other sector 
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of the economy because of the centrality of money and credit to modern society. At the same 
time this state-based material and institutional capacity can help to counterbalance the otherwise 
massive structural and concentrated power of private global finance over national developmental 
policy formation (McNally 2011; Soederberg 2004; Veltmeyer 2010). As David Harvey points out: “the 
raw money power wielded by the few undermines all semblances of democratic governance” (2010, 
220). In the control over money, democracy too is at stake. 
Ta b l e  3 : 




















Ziraat 85,066 (2nd; 
13.8)
37,816 59,858 1,112 1,458 24,374
Halkbank 48,242 (6th; 7.9) 29,761 35,072 1,083 771 13,643
VakıfBank 47,215 (7th; 7.7) 30,340 32,262 649 680 12,222
İller 6,031 (14th; 1.0) 4,121 0 131 19 2,514
eximbank 5,114 (15th; 0.8) 4,270 0 122 2 397
Kalkınma 1,479 (24th; 0.2) 984 0 13 1 708
Total 193,147 107,292 127,192 3,110 2,931 53,858
*Most recent year end data available as of August 2013. 
**Total loans and receivables = loans and receivables + loans under follow up - specific provisions. 
                                  Source: BAT online (accessed July 25, 2013).
Evaluating Turkey’s state-owned 
banks 
This brings us to a key question: do Turkish SOBs today still provide a viable alternative to the private 
financing of development and public infrastructure? To answer this we first need to reflect on the 
nature of research on banking. Most investigations of SOBs are rooted in mainstream neoclassical 
economic assumptions about self-maximizing egoistic individuals in conditions of scarcity (Caprio 
et al 2004). They also tend to adopt large-scale quantitative methodologies that test narrow pa-
rameters on the efficiency or developmental impact of state-owned banks (Boehmer et al 2005; 
Boubakri et al 2008; Dinç 2005; La Porta et al 2002). The outcomes are typically broad generaliza-
tions that cannot offer causal explanations as to why a given relationship prevails over another (the 
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classic ‘correlation does not equal causality’ caveat) (Bekaert et al 2005, 41). As such they say little 
about individual cases and do not contribute to understandings about agents’ motives in SOBs. 
The most recent global financial crisis has, however, opened things up as academics and develop-
ment institutions seek to reinvigorate the question of state banking’s impact on development (e.g. 
see, Brown 2013; Culpeper 2012; Lapavitsas 2009; Marshall 2010; von Mettenheim 2012). Still, there 
remains comparatively little reliable case study knowledge on the world’s vast array of SOBs, includ-
ing those in Turkey (see Marois 2012; Öztürk et al 2010).
The methods employed in this study are an attempt to build a more historical and qualitative per-
spective on state banking experiences, exploring motivations behind why changes in SOBs have 
occurred and examining differing perceptions of state banking. In addition to primary and second-
ary document analysis we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with a wide range of 
actors related to SOBs in Turkey. The majority of the interviews took place in the first half of 2013, 
mostly in Istanbul and Ankara but also in the central south (Adana) and the central north (Samsun). 
A total of 46 interviews were conducted, including five focus groups. Interviewees remain anon-
ymous for purposes of confidentiality, but the list included branch managers, senior head office 
sector managers, regional supervisors, and frontline bank workers. We also spoke with worker union 
representatives, academic banking experts, large agricultural producers, and regional directors from 
a nationwide agricultural workers association. In addition, we interviewed high-level financial bu-
reaucrats including past and current central bank officials, high ranking former Treasury officials, 
and a past official of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Finally, these interviews were supple-
mented by 16 previous interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 by one of the authors. While these 
interviews dealt specifically with bank privatizations in Turkey, those discussions contributed to our 
understanding of state banking today.
The interview questions were guided by an assessment criteria developed by the Municipal Services 
Project for evaluating the “success” of public enterprises (McDonald and Ruiters 2012). As the first 
such study of Turkish SOBs, these criteria are not all addressed or explored evenly. More often the 
interviews dealt with broad questions of equity, efficiency, sustainability, workplace quality, and 
public ethos in ways that allowed individuals to express their own experiences and understandings 
distinct from mainstream usage of such terms. Overall, the qualitative findings provide a wealth of 
unique and significant evidence hitherto unavailable and impossible to find within existing empiri-
cal research.
On the basis of these investigations we argue that Turkey’s SOBs continue to have significant per-
formance advantages over private banks, with important impacts on development, equity and 
sustainability. We highlight five notable benefits below: (1) extra-market financial coordination; (2) 
support in times of crisis and stability; (3) access to finance; (4) a savers’ safe haven that at the same 
time provides an alternative source of funding; and (5) efficiency.
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extra-market financial coordination
There is no replacement for being able to consciously and effectively guide economic policy, and 
being able to direct money is the most important coordination tool of all. Mainstream theory sug-
gests that regulation is sufficient to incentivize the private banking sector in any given direction 
(increase credits, fund certain sectors, reduce interest rates, etc) but in practice this has proven un-
reliable, as the most recent global financial crisis has most dramatically demonstrated. By contrast, 
the Turkish SOBs have proven themselves adept at the extra-market coordination of finance and 
development policies. 
Through Ziraat and Halkbank in particular, Turkish authorities can effectively direct subsidized cred-
its through what is now termed ‘income loss’ payments – direct government transfers made to these 
banks in compensation for providing low interest credits (PER 2008, 15). For example, in 2004 the 
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party) government sought to boost 
agricultural production by enhancing financial supports. To this end the government permitted 
Ziraat to reduce certain agricultural interest rates by 25 to 100 per cent of the market rate (PER 2008, 
134). The Treasury then compensated Ziraat for its associated ‘income losses’, which had grown to 
TRY 565 million by 2011 (roughly $340 million) (PER 2012). The direct transfers such as these keep 
the SOBs on sustainable footings. The same process applies to Halkbank and subsidized credits to 
cooperatives, SMEs, trades, and so on that have grown to nearly TRY 250 million (roughly $150 mil-
lion) (PER 2008, 137). Since the Treasury payments represent the subsidized interest rates alone, the 
actual loan amounts granted far exceed the ‘loss’ payments. While such support could flow through 
the private banks, the geographical reach, institutional structure, and funding expertise of Ziraat 
and Halkbank enable the smooth unrolling of these supports in an accessible, effective and efficient 
manner. Moreover, control over these monies remains within the public sphere, with less of the 
profit imperatives faced by private banks. This has important consequences at times of individual 
distress and economic crisis.
While these two substantive programs are geared toward agriculture and trades, there are no neces-
sary barriers to the SOBs developing greater expertise and funding capacity in other areas, such as in 
public sector development and infrastructure projects. There are existing practices that can be built 
on. Notably, Halkbank provides subsidized loans to municipalities with a letter of guarantee from 
the development bank, İller Bank. With this guarantee Halkbank can reduce the interest rate and of-
fer loans according to the needs of municipalities. Halkbank neither receives subsidies nor makes a 
profit from these loans; it cross-subsidizes the costs from earnings made elsewhere, notably on SME 
loans (confidential author interview, Halkbank, senior regional manager, June 2013, Samsun). 
A former high-ranking Treasury official and long-time state bureaucrat cited the important case of 
state-owned BOTAŞ (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) and the building of a natural gas pipeline. 
In the late 1990s, and amid global economic instability, a lack of foreign exchange threatened the 
completion of this massive public infrastructure project. Turkey’s private banks refused to lend to 
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the project but the Turkish SOBs, with a direct order from the Treasury, ended up funding the pipe-
line (confidential author interview, April 2013, Ankara).
Admittedly the level of public-public funding remains low (despite strong relationships between 
the state banks and other public sector enterprises). One Ziraat branch manager offers two reasons 
for this (confidential author interview, April 2013, Istanbul). First, the Turkish Banking Act sets limits 
on large credits, meaning big projects now require a syndicated loan (that is, made up of many 
banks), which are difficult to pull together for long-term, risky loans. Second, there is a fear of such 
loans being labelled ‘political credit’, which carries with it the risk that the state bank may be inves-
tigated if a new government comes into power. Nonetheless, the Ziraat manager believes the SOBs 
could play a larger role in public-public financing but faces political barriers.
Support in times of crisis and instability
Extra-market financial coordination often works behind the scenes, invisible to most people. The 
utility of this extra-market capacity becomes strikingly apparent in times of crisis and instability 
when private banks typically withdraw lending and call in existing loans to protect profits and assets. 
Indeed, Turkish governing authorities harshly criticized the private banks for doing just that during 
the 2008-2009 crisis (another example where regulation alone proved insufficient). By contrast, the 
SOBs – including Ziraat, Halkbank, VakıfBank, İller and Kalkınma – all increased their loan portfolios. 
Ziraat reports that at the height of the crisis, from September 2008 to June 2009, it alone provided 
TRY 5 billion of the total TRY 7.5 billion in new loans (public and private) while also offering special 
repayment terms (Ziraat 2010, 13-14, 27). For the year 2009, VakıfBank reports increasing loans by 
13.22 per cent (2010, 18) as does Halkbank by 25.6 per cent (2010, 5). Ziraat’s General Manager, Can 
Akın Çağlar, wrote in the bank’s Annual Report that this was a matter of “social responsibility… in 
order to minimize the pressures of economic recession on our farmers” (Ziraat 2010, 14). Likewise, a 
Halkbank branch manager expressed deep pride in that bank’s decision to increase lending while 
most other banks were cutting back (confidential author interview, June 2013, Samsun).
“Whereas the private banks do not place much limits on their loans, they charge much 
higher interest rates [around 20%]. Ziraat sets some limits but charges the lowest interest 
rates [around 5%]. When people fail to repay their loans, the private banks immediately 
confiscate their lands. but rather than selling any confiscated lands within three years, as 
per the law, the bankers transfer them to an associated foundation where they can hold 
onto them with no time limit [speculation on price increases]. Ziraat does not do this, but 
allows people time to sort out their problems.”
Ziraat branch Manager, confidential author interview, April 2013, Istanbul.
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While SOBs can increase lending in times of crisis, they also tend not to foreclose immediately 
on distressed or non-performing loans. According to one farmer in the Mediterranean region of 
Antalya, small-scale agricultural producers see Ziraat as their first banking choice (confidential au-
thor interview, April 2013, Antalya). This is because of Ziraat’s favourable interest rates but also due 
to softer sanctions in cases of loan default. Ziraat staff’s practice of offering several warnings and 
providing support services to the farmer was mentioned in interviews with other members of the 
national peasant farmer collective (TZOB), frontline bank workers, branch managers, and high-level 
supervisors as a positive aspect of Ziraat Bank. 
By contrast, as the private banks in Turkey have moved into the agricultural market they have also 
acted swiftly to repossess farms when loans have become non-performing.3 In some egregious 
cases, whole towns have seemingly come under private bank ownership due to credit defaults 
and repossessions. Neoliberals criticize the SOBs for keeping apparently unsustainable businesses 
and farmers afloat. Yet temporary liquidity problems do not amount to permanent unsustainability. 
Moreover, such responses fail to account for loss in national productivity, the impacts on individual 
and family income, and associated urban migration problems when farmland is repossessed and 
used for speculative gains (likely to be sold off to commercial farming ventures that are more en-
vironmentally taxing). Besides, all manner of farming subsidies are employed globally, especially 
in advanced economies, because policy-makers recognize the importance of a stable agricultural 
sector and the benefits of food security. The support offered by the SOBs should not be taken in 
isolation and simplistically labelled as ‘corrupt’ vote-getting (see ERF 2005, 106).
Access
It is an underappreciated fact that Turkish SOBs provide a nationwide financial infrastructure com-
prised of nearly 3,000 branches (see Table 3). While many developing countries struggle with 
providing financial ‘access’ outside urban centres today – apart from the new, costly and ethically 
questionable private sector ‘micro-finance’ schemes (Bateman 2010) – Turkey’s SOBs have been pres-
ent in towns and villages for decades. Today more than 400 Ziraat branches are in localities where 
no other banks are present (Ziraat 2010, 23-4). The SOB provides a rural service that most private 
banks, and especially foreign banks, eschew due to fixed capital and staff costs. At the same time, 
state authorities make use of Ziraat’s infrastructure to distribute various social supports, pensions 
and payments to individuals nationwide, without having to pay commissions to the private banks.
A saver’s safe haven and alternative funding
Turkey, like most emerging economies, has had its share of banking crises where speculative ex-
cesses have triggered spectacular financial collapses (Martinez-Diaz 2009). But since people often 
perceive the SOBs to be engaging in safer practices and because of implicit or explicit state guar-
antees backing them, they attract high levels of individual deposits. SOBs are viewed as a positive 
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alternative to the private sector, as a saver’s ‘safe haven’. This was made especially clear during the 
2008-2009 crisis when Turks flooded the SOBs. During this period Ziraat’s deposits grew by 17 per 
cent (2010, 14), Halkbank’s by over 9 per cent (2010, 5), and VakıfBank’s by over 13 per cent (2010, 
18). It is no small matter that in 2012 Turkey’s SOBs reported handling nearly 57 million savings 
accounts, which is more than half of all the bank accounts in Turkey. Ziraat alone had nearly 42 mil-
lion accounts (equal to almost all private commercial banks combined) (BAT 2012, II-238). At the 
same time the SOB deposit base is augmented by state authorities requiring Turkey’s public sector 
entities to channel deposits and payments through the SOBs. Consequently, the domestic savings 
deposited in the SOBs, which equal up to three quarters of the SOBs’ funding base, constitute an 
important alternative source of funding (BAT 2009, 71-4; 2012, I-6). 
Because the SOBs can attract large amounts of domestic savings they are not dependent on skittish 
international donors or flighty foreign capital (despite being able to access foreign finance regular-
ly). This reduces Turkey’s ever-present risk of capital flight, especially when instability or crisis erupts. 
In Turkey, as elsewhere, providing a credible safe haven for people’s deposits means the SOBs can 
lend counter-cyclically, as noted above (also see von Mettenheim and Butzbach 2012, 592). This fa-
cilitates overall economic stability in a country where the private sector has increased foreign debts, 
and therefore financial risks, tremendously. The SOBs’ alternative source of funding also means the 
government does not need to rely entirely on private or foreign capital for its borrowing require-
ments. The SOB deposit base can help fund government projects via purchasing Treasury bonds. 
During the recent crisis, for example, the AKP funded its modest stimulus package in this way rather 
than by increasing (socially regressive) VAT taxation as other countries did. Finally, holding a large 
domestic deposit base means that money held within the SOBs is less likely to be spirited abroad 
at times of crisis, unlike in private banks that rely on private and foreign investors for their funding 
base.
Whereas neoliberals explicitly seek to restrict people’s as well as governments’ savings and borrow-
ing options by concentrating bank ownership in the private and increasingly foreign banking sector, 
the size, scale and geographical reach of Turkey’s SOBs offer a safe and viable saving and funding 
alternative.
efficiency
The Turkish state banks, even in mainstream economic terms, are efficient, having made returns 
similar to private banks, averaging 1 per cent return on assets (ROA) prior to the 1980s (BAT 2009, 
98). The neoliberal transition brought peaks and valleys but the SOBs maintained an average 1-2 per 
cent ROA during the following 20 years (BAT 2009, 183). Since 2001 they oscillated between 1.5 to 
2.5 per cent ROA, pulling in billions in extra public revenue (similar to the private sector average). 
As the former Undersecretary of Treasury at the time of the country’s 2001 crisis acknowledged, 
the economic sustainability (i.e. profitability) of SOBs undermines much of the mainstream case for 
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bank privatization in Turkey (confidential author interview, August 2007, Ankara).
Two comparative analyses of Turkey’s private banks (foreign and domestic) and state banks con-
clude that the latter are in fact the most ‘efficient’ (Aysan and Ceyhan 2010; Kök and Ay 2013). One 
should add to this that the SOBs, unlike many private banks, duly pay their taxes and recycle profits 
back into public revenues (thus eliminating the costly chasing of lost public revenues into offshore 
tax havens by Turkish authorities). For example, in 2009 Ziraat paid TRY 906 million ($545 million) in 
taxes and posted earnings of over TRY 4.4 billion ($2.6 billion) (Ziraat 2010, 22). As a whole Turkish 
SOB returns, including those from the Central Bank, have helped reduce annual public debt from 
0.6 to 1.2 per cent between 2006 and 2010 inclusively (IMF 2012, 63). 
In sum, SOBs are not only efficient in narrow financial terms but translate into a range of beneficial 
public efficiencies impossible to capture by mainstream economics. The benefits can be found in 
socially desirable public infrastructure, in the pursuit of redistributive measures for the poor, or in 
a slower pace of accumulation that enables the ‘efficient’ use of human, natural and technological 
resources (see Gunn 2011; Spronk 2010). From this perspective we can recognize Turkey’s SOB op-
erations as socially efficient as well as financially efficient, given that they support key sectors such 
as agriculture, cooperatives and SMEs, providing loans in times of crisis, not foreclosing on overdue 
loans immediately, funding public infrastructure and backing green public initiatives. 
Can SOBs survive Turkey’s neoliberal 
government?
Much more can and should be done with the SOBs in Turkey. What lacks is a progressive vision 
among Turkey’s neoliberal AKP government. On the one hand, there seems to be a broad-based 
acceptance among Turks, from farmers to past finance ministers, that the SOBs are an important 
historical legacy and that their sustainable operations lend them real credibility. There also appears 
to be social sympathy, support and interest in the SOBs. But this has not translated into active and 
preventative social mobilization against further market-oriented restructuring and privatizations. 
Banking and finance in general tend to be an alienating and threatening subject for most people 
– a problem exacerbated by the highly technical and exclusionary research of most mainstream 
analysts. 
On the other hand, the AKP is firmly committed to privatization, having sold off far more SOE assets 
in the first few years after coming to power in 2002 than in the previous 20 years combined (Önis 
2011). The AKP party platform clearly states that SOE privatizations are necessary for an efficient 
economy, committing to carrying them out in a fast and transparent way.4 The main opposition, the 
centrist CHP, has a party program critical of AKP’s rapid privatizations but nonetheless supports SOE 
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sell-outs if appearing in the public interest or if increasing efficiency and competition.5 That said, 
the SOBs generate a lot of public revenue now and represent proven economic stabilizing forces. 
Any government, however neoliberal, may find it difficult to relinquish control over such powerful 
economic tools.
One must not romanticize Turkey’s state banks, of course. It is important to acknowledge that there 
have been instances of corruption in the Turkish SOBs. Corruption, however, is by no means re-
stricted to the SOBs and privatization by no means provides a sure-fire solution to the problem 
(to the contrary, often the magnitude of corruption increases). Rather, different institutional and 
governance mechanisms need to be explored that eliminate the potential for short-term political 
abuses of the SOBs while still enabling democratic, extra-market coordination of financing for de-
velopment. Fortunately, there are many existing alternative governance structures from which to 
draw creative and effective ideas: from the stakeholder model of European savings banks (Butzbach 
2012), to the legal incorporation of worker and sectoral representatives directly on the boards of 
Indian SOBs (Chakrabarti 2012), to more radical ideas around a worker-owned and controlled pub-
lic cooperative bank as seen in Costa Rica.6 It remains true, however, that SOBs always seem to be 
under more scrutiny than private banks, such that any problem is magnified (confidential author in-
terview, Ziraat Branch Manager, April 2013, Istanbul). Neoliberal advocates have long assaulted the 
integrity of public service, which exacerbates the problem (see Fine 2008). Whereas failed private 
banks are ‘but a few bad apples’, state banks (‘efficient’ or not) are deemed inherently and endemi-
cally ‘corrupt’. Recognizing state banks as viable alternatives requires exposing this distortionary 
perspective.
Conclusion
There is much to be said for the alternative operations of Turkey’s state-owned banks despite neolib-
eral restructuring. Yet for advocates of progressive alternatives to private provisioning it is important 
to recognize that the SOBs’ new profit mandates have and may further erode their social and devel-
opmental ‘alternative’ efficacy. This should not be taken as the end of the story, though. Even in an 
era defined by intense financial and profit imperatives, the Turkish SOBs can and do challenge mar-
ket orthodoxy. The fact that the SOBs have changed over time, moreover, should be read positively: 
it means that they are historically malleable institutions, which are neither inherently corrupt nor 
inefficient but capable of moving beyond capitalistic goals. Profit imperatives can be reversed, de-
velopmental mandates institutionalized, democratic governance enforced, public-public financing 
enhanced, privatizations halted, and SOB assets amplified. To say this is not to support an idealized 
Keynesian post-war model in Turkey. Rather, the point is to build on the state banks’ credible and 
developmentally progressive successes to craft even better, more sustainable, and substantively 
democratic institutions for the financing of development and public infrastructure, without which a 
break with neoliberalism is inconceivable.
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There is thus an urgent need to develop and discuss popular and political strategies that aim not 
simply to defend Turkey’s SOBs but to reclaim their most progressive mandates and to innovate 
well beyond their present limitations. Below we identify seven strategies of defence and innovation 
that can help guide popular forces toward more substantive banking alternatives. These include the 
following:
•	 Moving beyond a legal defence: In Turkey, SOB privatization was halted by 
constitutional challenges but this legalistic strategy failed to build a social basis 
of support. Privatization advocates subsequently eliminated these legal barri-
ers, showing that legal strategies have limits when neoliberal governments are 
committed to privatization.
•	 collective organization in the banking sector: Bank workers are often unor-
ganized; in Turkey, where unions exist, they are fragmented and sectarian, and 
any collective bank worker action is illegal. There is a need to organize bank 
workers in both the state and private banks. Any progressive changes to the 
SOBs will require internal support and private bank workers also benefit from 
a strong public sector as part of building a broader labour movement. Worker 
solidarity should cut across the public-private divide in banking.
•	 Solidarity across sectors: There is little dialogue, let alone solidarity, between 
banking workers and other ‘traditional’ labour unions, either within the public 
sector or between the public and private sectors. Yet the defence of the SOBs 
requires society-wide support given the powerful financial forces associated 
with neoliberal capitalism. Bank workers must link strategically to other unions 
in other economic sectors. It is also evident that many other sectors (public and 
private) could derive long-term benefit from establishing links to the SOBs, no-
tably in terms of building access to sustainable finance.
•	 public finance as a common good: Finance really constitutes the nerve centre 
of the modern capitalist society; it touches all aspects of life, work, and social re-
production. Workers must move toward building a coordinated, popular sector 
resistance against bank privatization as a common social goal drawing in NGOs, 
activists, women’s organizations, minority communities, charity organizations, 
and so on. The point here is not simply to resist privatization but to: (a) craft an 
effectively representative social base; and (b) in the process build real social ca-
pacity against the mounting dominance of private financial capital.
•	 Democratized banking: Social solidarity must be institutionalized within 
the banking sector. The seemingly obvious point that the banks depend on 
20  MSP Occasional Paper No. 22 – December 2013
controlling our collective resources but do so without democratic represen-
tation needs to be exposed and built on. The push to defend SOBs must be 
an integrated push toward radically different and democratized banking 
foundations.
•	 collective ownership and control: In the current conjuncture the defence of 
state ownership is necessary to confront existing power structures. Yet rescuing 
state ownership alone is also unable to fulfill the strategies above. Unchecked 
political abuse can be a real problem in SOBs. Thus, new forms of collective de-
mocratized ownership and control must be institutionalized in order to pursue 
social developmental goals. This need not be idealistic as different models of 
ownership and control already exist elsewhere, even if imperfect.
•	 radical scholarship: Knowledge of existing alternatives to private corporate 
bank ownership and imagination for what is possible is lacking. Radical and 
progressive scholars have almost entirely abandoned questions of finance and 
development to conventional neoclassical and development economists that 
reinforce either market-led imperatives or the supposed benefits of an elitist, 
statist economy. Both approaches have failed to achieve democratized owner-
ship and control over society’s collective money resources. Much work needs to 
be done to reveal the alternative histories, contemporary practices and authen-
tic alternatives of banks in Turkey and in dozens of other societies.
The Turkish state-owned banks’ material reproduction is fundamentally rooted within the state ap-
paratus. This means that the SOBs need not rely on profit imperatives to reproduce themselves. In 
this way the Turkish SOBs worked sustainably for decades. In doing so they pursued specific devel-
opmental mandates from supporting agriculture to cooperatives to small trades to infrastructure. In 
the process the SOBs built up significant institutional expertise. While neoliberal restructuring has 
eroded much of the state-led developmental logic, important alternative institutional operations 
continue to prevail in the SOBs. In contrast to private banks that regularly engage in capital flight, 
transfer funds abroad, cut funding at times of crisis, refuse to finance infrastructure, exploit farmers, 
and so on, the SOBs tend not to engage in the worst of these profit-maximizing practices. 
To recognize this is not to idealize state banks. Much can and must be done to create more pro-
gressive, democratic and developmentally responsive banks, which will include reversing aspects of 
neoliberal restructuring to date. But it also means struggling for better models of alternative bank-
ing. The Turkish example, in this regard, has a lot to offer to those interested in understanding what 
options exist. Turkey is but one of many examples that have yet to be fully identified and examined. 
There is great need for further research into existing public banking and financial alternatives to 
private provisioning. This is the sine qua non for building sustainable and progressive alternatives to 
neoliberalism.
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Endnotes
1 For a more detailed discussion see Marois 2013.
2 That is, banks developed the political right to augment the savings held well above their actual amount; for every unit of currency held in reserve a 
banker could loan out on average 10 more units.
3 Önal (2013) summarizes the recent changes in the agricultural loan market as privatization of the sources of funds. 
4 See http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi#bolum (accessed on May 2, 2013).
5 CHP, Çağdaş Türkiye İçin Değişim Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı, http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf (accessed on May 2, 
2013). Also validated in an interview with a senior CHP economic advisor.
6 The following comes from the Banco Popular website (https://www.popularenlinea.fi.cr/bpop/), including its audited financial statements and 
president’s directives. See also Marois 2013.
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